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Book Reviews
K. S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY (U.
California Press 1991) [312 pp.] Index of Names, Index of Subjects, Notes. CIP
91-3294; ISBN 0-520-07287-1 (Cloth $39.95); ISBN 0-520-07289-8 (Pbk.
$15.95). [2120 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, CA 94720.]
There are odd moments when one is glad that contemporary
philosophers have not altogether removed themselves from the debate
over public issues. After reading this book, I experienced one of those
moments. Professor Shrader-Frechette has welded an apparently
encyclopedic knowledge of envirorimental risk events with a deep
understanding of epistemology, ethics, economics, science and politics
to create an exhaustive critique of present practices in risk assessment.
She finds them lacking and proposes a clear alternative.
The problem presented by large scale activities that expose unknown
people (the "public") to risks of uncertain range, duration, and severity
is clear: A market mechanism is not even arguably able to solve such
problems, and a second best solution will inevitably result in decisions
by one set of people that expose others unwittingly and unwillingly to
risk. Professor Shrader-Frechette argues that the two existing candidates
for second best - naive positivism and.cultural relativism - are
critically misguided. Where naive positivism atiempts value-free
objectivity, it succeeds only in burying value choices in the complexity
of its analysis. And cultural relativism, which rejects the possibility of
objective analysis where values are concerned, condemns the entire
activity to simple choice, unilluminated by rational discourse.
Professor Shrader-Frechette's proposal, "scientific proceduralism,"
is based upon the proposition, which she strongly argues, that
rationality is possible in value-laden decisions. Risk-cost-benefit
analysis (RCBA) might, for example, form the basis for risk evaluation,
but, where that is the end of the process of evaluation to the naive
positivists, she would subject it to adversarial assessment from
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alternative ethical systems. A given RCBA might, then, be evaluated
and argued from the standpoint of Benthamite utilitarianism, Rawlsian
egalitarianism, Nietzshean elitism, or Paretian libertarianism. Each
ethical system would provide a ground from which the RCBA could be
assessed. The procedure would be competitive, each advocate arguing
the strengths of one interpretation over the others.
Professor Shrader-Frechette devotes the last two chapters of the
book to suggestions for implementing scientific proceduralism. The idea
has obvious applicability in the regulatory process, where RCBA is
ubiquitous. Its implementation in the political arena, which is significant
because of the decentralized nature of American land use decisions, is
less clear. It is in her discussion of the judicial process that her ideas are
to me, perhaps because I am a lawyer, most compelling.
On the face of it the judicial process is not a likely prospect for the
implementation of scientific proceduralism. Only when it passes on an
appeal from a regulatory or political decision is the judicial process
involved in a risk decision prior to the creation of the risk, and then its
review is narrowly procedural. Courts are generally involved after a risk
has manifest itself in injury, as in the case of environmental tort
litigation. That is hardly the time or place to implement scientific
proceduralism, though one might imagine that if it were required, rather
than RCBA, the failure of the defendant to implement it properly might
be the basis for a finding of fault.
The judicial process comes into this story in a different way,
according to Professor Shrader-Frechette. Were those injured by an
environmental risk better able to prove the case, the costs of an
environmentally risky project would be forced onto the actor, who
would then have to internalize them. Knowing that it would be forced to
internalize the cost of injuries, the actor would be forced before
undertaking a risky project to put its money where its mouth was: To
undertake only those actions for which it could afford to adjust the cost
of its product or service. Any inaccuracy in its RC3A would then come
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back to haunt it, for it would either fail to undertake projects because of
overstated RCBAs, or undertake projects that turned out to be more
costly than the RCBAs had predicted. Under such circumstances, one
might expect the people involved to act responsibly.
But how might the judicial process be made efficient enough to
make such discipline on risky actors effective? Professor Shrader-
Frechette mentions a variety of proposals. The fundamental problem is
that conventional tort law is not the ideal place for claims by those who
have been injured by environmental risks. Tort law looks for fault on
the part of the actors, and in these actions the actors are liable to be able
to show extraordinary expense and effort bent to assessing and avoiding
harms. What is needed is a cause of action in which the plaintiff need
only prove that a recognized risk caused harm. The plaintiff's recovery
would be proportioned to the statistical contribution that the defendant's
actions made to the likelihood or severity of the injury. Such a
procedure would force the defendant to internalize all of the costs of its
actions, not simply those that resulted from fault.
In the hands of an entrepreneurial tort lawyer RISK AND
RATIONALITY could be a most potent force for the emergence of a new
flavor of tort law. Were such a theory to emerge, however, it would
reduce the need for scientific proceduralism for it would approximate a
Pareto-like solution to the problem of risk. An action is optimal under
the Pareto criterion if everyone is either unaffected by it or made better
off. Were firms to be forced by the law to compensate everyone who
lost from a risk to indifference, it is at least arguable that they would
undertake only projects that satisfied this criterion.
It is not likely, however, that Professor Shrader-Frechette would
find this judicial solution satisfactory. One reason is that it would not, in
fact, result in a Pareto optimal solution, for it would force costs upon
people, then pay those costs. But is suspected that her objection would
go deeper. There is in her analysis the rumblings of two values that
would not be satisfied by this solution. One is her suspicion of the
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willingness of those affected by decisions. Throughout this book, she is
concerned that what appears to be willing acceptance of risk is either
somehow biologically predetermined (i.e., risk preference) or coerced
by circumstance (i.e., poverty). The second weakness that she might
find is that it avoids citizen participation. She quotes Thomas Jefferson
to the effect that an ignorant citizenry should not be denied the power to
make decisions; rather, they should be informed. There is, one
suspects, a virtue in public decision-making beyond the plain virtue of
better decisions about risk.
RISK AND RATIONALITY is not an easy read. Professor Shrader-
Frechette makes a succession of powerful points and resolves them with
an important proposed change in the way decisions are made. Her
argument is throughout spare and clean, her prose free from didactic
asides, and the whole work is illuminated with pithy descriptions of
actual controversies. It is demanding but leaves the reader grateful that
such demands were made.
W. KIP VisCusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(Harvard U. Press 1991). [270 pp.] Appendices, bibliography, index, notes.
CIP 90-23161, ISBN 0-674-75323-2 (Cloth $39.95). [79 Garden Street Cambridge,
MA 02138.]
In this book, Professor Viscusi has confirmed the lawyer's worst
fears of economic analysis of law: He has missed the point. It is as if a
deaf man set out to do a policy analysis of classical music. The result
might be intriguing because of its unique viewpoint, but one would be
highly suspicious at the author's suggestion that all music should, for
example, be written in the key of E flat because the most commercially
successful classical music has been written in that key.
It is clear that Professor Viscusi recognizes, even insists upon, his
perspective: "I view products liability reform.., as a question of
designing an appropriate institutional mechanism to control risks and
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compensate victims of product-related injuries." But he does not assess
products liability law as if that were its purpose; to Professor Viscusi,
that is its purpose. For all its empirical tone, the central message of this
book is a normative one: If it is not, in fact, the purpose of products
liability law to control risks and compensate Victims - and there is
much of products liability law that is nonsensical from that point of view
- it should be.
This book is the coming home to roost of one of the most
problematic propositions in Richard Posner's seminal ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW. From the standpoint of safety, according to Posner,
it did not matter whether the law applied a negligence standard or an
absolute liability standard to products. If it applied a negligence
standard, producers would take cost-justified loss-avoidance. The cost
of accidents would rest upon those who were injured by irreducible
risks, for they could not show that the manufacturer was negligent.
Under an absolute liability standard, firms would take the same level of
cost avoidance, though they would have to pay those who were
nonetheless injured. There would be a distributional difference between
the doctrines (absolute liability would make victims, and their lawyers,
richer), but no allocative difference between them; the injury rate would
be the same under both regimes.
So what? If the purpose of products liability law was to optimize the
injury rate, we would be indifferent as between the two doctrines. If the
purpose were to compensate victims, law would favor absolute liability.
It follows, then, that if the purpose of the law was both optimizing the
injury rate and compensating victims (which are the two purposes that
Dr. Viscusi finds underlying products liability), there is an ideal rule:
absolute liability. The law, they would predict, will move toward an
absolute liability rule as soon as it gets its act together.
Courts have indeed toyed with the idea of absolute liability (and its
vacuous kin, "strict liability") over the past thirty years but have
resoundingly rejected it in every state. That might suggest to economists
that there is a dominant purpose lurking in products liability law which
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has thus far escaped them. I suspect that this has, indeed, dawned on
Professor Posner, now a judge on a federal court of appeals. But it
seems to have altogether escaped Professor Viscusi, for he adamantly
grounds his analysis on controlling risk and compensating victims.
What then is the deeper purpose that could account for the law's
rejection of absolute liability? The answer to that question, unfortunately
requires a different way of thinking than that employed by Professor
Viscusi. His thinking is what is called "instrumental" or
"consequentialist." That is, he views law as an instrument to be used
toward the provision of a larger social objective. In this case, products
liability should be an instrument for delivering "an appropriate
institutional mechanism to control risks and compensate victims." It is
no accident that the purposes toward which he imagines products
liability law bent happen to be quantifiable and therefore amenable to the
kind of quantitative analysis that his discipline prepares him for.
There is another way of thinking about law referred to as "formative
reasoning." Here, the law is viewed as a process for forming the
normative sense of the members of a society. By publicly recognizing
and documenting wrongs, the law reinforces the sense of responsibility
in its members and helps shape it to new realities. The sense of right and
wrong, under this view, is an emergent phenomenon, as the law itself
gropes now left, now right, attempting to unearth the responsibilities
that humans have in new situations.
The history of products liability law is particularly supportive of
such a view of law. Negligence law grew out of the context of direct
human interaction, of people accidentally hitting each other with sticks,
running over pedestrians, or docking their boats at piers they did not
own. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the dominant
mode of economic organization had become the firm. Decisions made
within the firm would affect people whom the decision-makers never
knew and cause injuries to people whom they never saw. Worse, those
who were injured had a devil of a time proving who had done them
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wrong. The tort law of the time was distinctly people-oriented, so the
plaintiff had to bring the specific wrongdoer into court. With the advent
of the corporation that was not easy.
The corporation itself had a formative effect upon people, but a
distinctly negative one. By wrapping the decision-maker in layers of
organizational protection, it removed the person from the immediate
context within which his sense of right and wrong was triggered. It was
entirely possible to feel very good about oneself, to treat wife and
neighbors with exemplary kindness, while adopting corporate policies
that would strike limbs from the workers and poison the environment.
It became necessary for law to penetrate such a context, to open it to.
scrutiny. Law has several mechanisms for doing this, and it used them
all - antitrust, rate regulation, safety regulation, and so on. Products
liability proved to be a particularly handy mechanism, as Professor
Posner has pointed out, because it made every person his or her own
attorney general, penetrating the corporation in pursuit of redress of
wrong. Such a task is not, however, an easy one. Products liability
cases are among the most difficult to prove, for the defendant generally
has many orders of magnitude more resources to use, and it controls the
facts that plaintiffs need to prove. The law needed to expand the
products liability plaintiff's power. How to do it?
In retrospect, the law had a mechanism that would have been ideal
for the job, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant to prove that it was not negligent upon
the plaintiff's showing an injury that was probably caused by someone,
somewhere committing a wrong. But in the seminal California case,
Escola v. CocaCola, Judge Traynor, rejecting the direction of the rest
of the court set on the path of applying res ipsa to products cases,
opined that this was a good area for absolute liability. Where res ipsa
would increase the plaintiff's power by reducing its burden of proof,
absolute liability gave the plaintiff the incentive to file suit by promising
a pot of gold, whether the defendant was at fault or not.
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Absolute liability was a lousy idea, for it compromised the
normative foundation of tort law by promising compensation without
fault; it threatened to eviscerate the morally formative power of tort law,
turning it into a weird form of insurance. As with all bad ideas in law, it
eventually died, but not until it had excited plaintiff's lawyers to a frenzy
of creativity and had shaken corporate executives to their roots. The
confusion that it caused was probably worthwhile, for it got the
attention of those most deeply buried in the corporate cocoon,
threatening to expose their most private memos to the fresh breeze of
discovery.
A formative perspective would predict that judges would refuse to
yield the idea of fault, and that is precisely what.has happened. The
doctrine of absolute liability was explicitly rejected early on, and in its
place came the rhetoric of "strict liability" - from its inception, a name
without a notion. There is no intermediate point between negligence
liability, that requires the plaintiff to prove causation by fault, and
absolute liability, that requires only proof of causati6n. The rhetoric of
strict liability did, however, let judges capture the idea that, where
products were concerned, they were not going to apply garden-variety
negligence law. Today, it is safe to say that, in most jurisdictions,
products liability is negligence law, but the burden shifts to the
corporate defendant upon the showing of a "defect" without requiring
the plaintiff to identify the individual responsible for the defect.
I suggest, then, that the formative purpose underlying products
liability law fits the actual history of this law far better than Professor
Viscusi's instrumental purposes (injury reduction and victim
compensation). Now it is clear that the two types of purpose are related.
If products liability induces a sense of responsibility in otherwise
isolated corporate officials, one would expect that to show up in safer
products. Safer products are, however, an artifact of the underlying
purpose. Victim compensation, by contrast, is the engine that drives the
responsibility-producing system. By offering the successful plaintiff the
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potential for a financial bonanza, the law creates an incentive for
plaintiff's lawyers to penetrate to the deepest layers of corporate
insulation. From an instrumental perspective, capping injury awards
would save little of the cost of products liability, as Professor Viscusi
points out. From a formative perspective, it would drastically reduce the
incentive to prosecute a case that is hard to prove. It is a very bad idea,
not because it would cause accident rates to rise but because it would
create an incentive for corporations to hide their actions under ever
deeper layers of protection, making cases against them ever more
difficult to prove.
The difference between the instrumental and formative views is best
illustrated by the Ford Pinto case. To Professor Viscusi the problem in
that case was that Ford based its valuation of life on damage awards by
courts, which were too low. As a result, it severely undervalued the
losses that the relocation of the gas tank would avoid in its cost-benefit
analysis. Had Ford calculated the losses correctly it would have found
them to be ten times greater than the costs of making the change. Ford
goofed.
That would explain why Ford would have to pay compensatory
damages, but it doesn't explain colossal punitive damages, later
reduced, assessed against Ford. Clearly the thing that burned up the jury
was the very fact that Ford was calculating the value of human life.
Doing so, it might be felt, is like a murderer who feels fine about killing
a sick person because he knows that the value of the sick person's life is
so low that he can afford to compensate for it. To the jury, what Ford
did was evil.
It is at precisely this point that the formative and instrumental views
clash, and I am tempted to side with the instrumentalists. Products
liability law requires that each person act responsibly. A corporate
officer is, however, responsible both to his or her customers and
shareholders. If expenses are to be increased, those expenses must be
justified, and justified in terms of corporate finance. Doing a cost-
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benefit analysis does not evince a coldness of spirit but rather
responsible corporate behavior. Yet it does evince an impulse to treat
human beings as objects, rather than subjects, so is suspect.
It must be said that Professor Viscusi's analysis, in the best
traditions of economic analysis of law, sheds considerable light on the
operation of the system. Particularly telling is his analysis of the
insurance crisis (attributable, in substantial measure, to insurance
practices rather than products liability law) and hazard warning law (for
which he proposes a sensible general scheme). Odd, however, is his
entertainment of one of the worst ideas to make itself onto the products
liability scene, Dean Wade's risk-utility test. What, one might ask, is a
court doing evaluating the utility of a product? Is that not the
quintessential job for markets? Professor Viscusi does indeed ask that
question, even shows that it is impossible to administer as a judicial test
because it is mired in Kenneth Arrow's indeterminacy of individual
values, but proceeds nonetheless to accept it as the most rational of the
tests of products liability. One suspects that Professor Viscusi is
resident on the utilitarian side of the economic analysis aisle.
Lest this seem to be faint praise for a serious work of scholarship,
let me say that I found Professor Viscusi's empirical analysis
illuminating, clearly grounded and helpful, particularly in pointing to
what appears to be an emerging reinterpretation of law.
Hugh H. Gibbonst
t Mr. Gibbons is Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law Center.
